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华谊兄弟最难一年还有雷为保壳或一亏到底财务洗澡
2020-01-07 23:51   来源:  www.yaya-resort.com   评论:0 点击:

华谊兄弟最难一年还有雷为保壳或一亏到底财务洗澡华谊兄弟若连续两年亏损,2020年将面临巨大的退市和保壳压

  华谊兄弟若连续两年亏损,2020年将面临巨大的退市和保壳压力,不排除该公司会在2019年报的会计处理上采取“一亏到底”的激进策略进行财务大洗澡,轻装上阵为2020年的扭亏和保壳腾出足够的财务灵活空间;

Huayi brothers will face huge delisting and shell-holding pressure in 2020 if they lose money for two consecutive years, not ruling out that the company will adopt a radical strategy of \"one loss to the end\" in the accounting treatment of the 2019 report to take a big financial bath, and light up to make enough financial flexibility for the 2020 turnaround and shell protection.

  华谊兄弟的历史利润并非主要来自其主营业务,投资收益贡献了该公司绝大部分历史利润,最近两年华谊兄弟的投资业务急转直下,2019年其投资业务更是陷入亏损――资产泡沫破灭之后,华谊兄弟靠投资驱动利润表扩张的模式已经难以为继;

Huayi's historical profit is not mainly from its main business, investment income contributed most of the company's historical profits, the last two years of Huayi's investment business has plummeted, its investment business in 2019 is even more into a loss -- asset bubble burst, Huayi Brothers investment-driven profit statement expansion model has been unsustainable;

  华谊兄弟连续巨额亏损之后,其资产负责结构急剧恶化,其目前的流动资产已经不能覆盖流动负债,陷入了资金链非常紧张的局面――为了避免信用违约,华谊兄弟正在采取大规模地“借新还旧”的“滚动展期”方式偿债,但此举无法从根本上解决其债务压力问题;

Huayi's current assets are no longer able to cover its current liabilities and are in a tight financial chain after a series of losses. Huayi Brothers is taking a massive \"new and old\" approach to paying off its debt in order to avoid a credit default.

  在偿债压力山大的情况下,已经不能再贡献投资收益的长期股权投资已经事实上沦为华谊兄弟资产负债表上的赘肉――如果接下来华谊兄弟主业不发生远超预期的大逆转,该公司极可能将被迫采取大规模地“砍赘肉”的方式来“缩表瘦身“,仿海航之道以解决其流动性问题……

The long-term equity investment, which can no longer contribute to the return on investment, has de facto become the weight on Huayi Brothers'balance sheet - and if there is no bigger-than-expected reversal of Huayi Brothers'main business, the company will most likely be forced to \"downsize\" on a massive scale, following HNA's path to address its liquidity problems.

  《人民日报》上周的一篇报道显示,刚刚过去的2019年,国内电影市场保持不断增长的势头,全国票房收入再创历史新高,达到了亿元,较上年同期增长%――在国内电影票房持续增长并创下历史新高的同时,华谊兄弟却创下了另一个与之截然相反的记录:遭遇了史上最惨的业绩滑坡,收入大幅缩水近五成并陷入持续巨额亏损的泥潭。

Last week's 《 People's Daily report showed that in the past 2019, the domestic film market has maintained its growing momentum, with the country's box office revenue hitting another record high of 100 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of%-- another record in contrast to China Huayi Brothers'record: suffered one of the worst declines in its history, with revenues plunging nearly five percent and plunging into the quagmire of continuing losses.

  三季报显示,华谊兄弟2019年1-9月实现营业收入亿元,同比大幅缩水了%;其同期归属上市公司股东的净利润出现了亿元的巨额亏损,不出意外的话,该公司2019年全年持续巨额亏损几成定局。

The three-quarter report showed that huayi's january-january 2019 revenue of 100 million yuan, a sharp decline of% over the same period; its net profit attributable to shareholders of listed companies in the same period showed a huge loss of 100 million yuan, not surprisingly, the company continued to lose a few percent of the year 2019.

  这已经是华谊兄弟连续两年持续大额亏损,2018年,该公司最终的归属上市公司股东的净利润同样巨额亏损了亿元,这也是华谊兄弟自有公开可追溯的财务记录以来出现的首次亏损。

It's already been Huayi Brothers'two consecutive years of sustained large losses, and in 2018, the company's final net profit attributable to shareholders of listed companies was the same huge loss of 100 million yuan, its first loss since Huayi Brothers had a publicly traceable financial record.

  而且,尤其值得注意的是,如果说华谊兄弟2018年的巨额亏损主要是商誉“黑天鹅”导致的一次性、非现金亏损的话,那么该公司2019年的巨额亏损则是真正实打实地业务性亏损。

And, especially noteworthy, if Huayi Brothers'huge losses in 2018 are mainly one-time, non-cash losses caused by goodwill \"Black Swan,\" then the company's huge losses in 2019 are a real real-world business loss.

  华谊兄弟2018年的资产减值损失高达亿元,其中商誉减值损失一项就高达近10亿元,这是造成华谊兄弟当年巨额亏损的直接原因,如果将上述“黑天鹅”的因素剔除掉,华谊兄弟2018年的业绩其实并不算太难看,尤其是其当年的营收仍然达到了亿元,较2017年只微幅下跌了%。

Huayi Brothers lost as much as 100 million yuan in impairment of assets in 2018, of which nearly 1 billion yuan in goodwill impairment, which is the direct cause of Huayi Brothers'huge losses that year, and if the above \"black swan\" factors are removed, Huayi Brothers'performance in 2018 is actually not too ugly, especially its revenue of that year still reached 100 million yuan, a small decline of% from 2017.

  不过,从2019年前三季度的数据来看,华谊兄弟似乎已经由“黑天鹅”引发的偶然亏损,转入了全面的业务性亏损轨道,其资产减值损失已经不再构成亏损大户,其亏损的主要原因,就是营收大幅缩水的同时,各项成本和费用依旧高企造成的。

However, from the first three quarters of 2019 data, Huayi Brothers seems to have been \"black swan\" caused by the occasional loss, into a full-scale business loss track, its asset impairment losses have no longer constituted a large loss, the main reason for the loss is that the huge loss of revenue at the same time, the costs and expenses remain high.

  透镜公司研究认为,华谊兄弟2018年亏损虽大,但其亏损主要是账面的一次性、非现金亏损,这种亏损一般并不会影响公司的实际现金流,对其实际业务的正常运转影响也较为有限;但华谊兄弟2019年的亏损,却是一次会实质影响其公司现金流的业务性亏损,这种亏损会直接损害公司的正常业务――这一点,从华谊兄弟的现金流量表即可大致看出来:2018年巨亏亿元当年,华谊兄弟经营活动的现金流还呈现出亿元的大额净流入;而2019年前三季度,华谊兄弟亏损亿元的同时,其经营活动的现金流也随之出现了亿元的净流出。

Although the loss in 2018 is large, but its loss is mainly a one-time, non-cash loss on the book, such a loss generally does not affect the company's actual cash flow, the impact on the normal operation of its business is relatively limited; but Huayi Brothers 2019 losses, but a substantial impact on its company's cash flow business losses, this loss will directly damage the company's normal business -- this point, from Huayi Brothers cash flow statement can be seen as:2018 losses of 100 million yuan, Huayi Brothers operating cash flow also showed a large net inflow of 100 million yuan; and in the first three quarters of 2019, Huayi Brothers losses of 100 million yuan, the same time, its business activities with the emergence of a net outflow of 100 million yuan.

  说句题外话,透镜公司研究预计,如果华谊兄弟2019年全年真如上所料继续亏损,那么该公司在接下来的2020年将会面临着巨大的退市压力,王氏兄弟应该会竭尽所能确保华谊兄弟在2020年扭亏脱困――为了确保这样的目标实现,一个非常有效的办法就是:索性让华谊兄弟2019年度“一亏到底”,进行一次深度“财务洗澡”,轻装上阵为2020年的扭亏、保壳腾出足够的财务灵活空间――当然,这纯属猜测。

In a nutshell, lens research predicts that if huayi brothers continue to lose money for the full year of 2019, then the company will face huge delisting pressure in the next 2020, and wang's brothers should do their utmost to ensure that huayi brothers turn around in 2020- a very effective way to ensure that such a goal is achieved is to let huayi brothers \"a loss to the end\" of 2019,\" a deep \"financial bath \", light for the 2020 turnaround, the shell to make enough financial flexibility - of course, this is pure speculation.

  在2018年陷入巨额亏损之前,华谊兄弟历史至今盈利能力和成长性一直都表现得相当不错,其营收从2006年的亿元一路增长到2017年的亿元,其净利润更是从2006年的2356万元暴增至2017年的亿元,不过该公司净利润的最高记录则出现在2015年,其当年的净利润达到了亿元。

Before plunging into a huge loss in 2018, Huayi Brothers's history of profitability and growth has been quite good so far, with its revenue rising all the way from $100 million in 2006 to $100 million in 2017, and its net profit soaring from $23.56 million in 2006 to $100 million in 2017, although the company's highest net profit recorded in 2015, with its net profit reaching $100 million that year.

  透镜公司研究认为,支撑华谊兄弟业绩一路狂飙的,并不是其影视票房和版权收入,而是其被外界广为忽略的投资业务。

Lens research suggests that it is not its film and television box office and copyright revenues that are driving huayi's performance, but its widely overlooked investment business.

  自2012年开始,投资业务就开始在华谊兄弟的利润表中扮演着举足轻重的地位:当年,华谊兄弟的投资收益达到了5618万元,占其同期净利润的%;此后,这一比例逐年上升,投资业务逐步成为华谊兄弟账面利润的主要来源。

Since 2012, the investment business has played an important role in huayi's profit statement: huayi's investment income reached 56.18 million yuan, or% of its net profit in the same period; since then, the proportion has increased year by year, and the investment business has gradually become the main source of huayi's book profit.

  统计数据显示,华谊兄弟2012年至2018年7年间累计实现净利润亿元(盈亏相抵,下同),投资收益累计贡献了其中的亿元,占比高达%;尤其是,在某些年度,例如2016年,华谊兄弟的投资收益甚至超过了其最终的净利润,换句话来说就是:若不是因为投资收益,华谊兄弟的历史性首亏可能就要提前到2016年了。

According to the statistics, huayi's cumulative net profit between 2012 and 2018 was 100 million yuan (the same below), and the cumulative contribution of investment income was 100 million yuan, or as much as%; in particular, in some years, for example, in 2016, huayi's investment income even exceeded its final net profit, in other words: if it was not for the investment income, the historical first loss of huayi's brother might have been ahead of schedule until 2016.

  从华谊兄弟披露的历史财报来看,该公司的投资收益并非主要来自银行理财、证券或其他金融衍生品投资,而是绝大部分都来自于股权投资,且其中还有相当大的部分是并无实际现金流支撑的账面公允价值变动收益――更有甚者,华谊兄弟的这些账面公允价值变动收益中还有大量是纯属会计入账方式调整后带来的“账面增量”,即坊间常说的“通过会计手段操纵出来不带来现金流的利润”――不过,关于这一点,并不是本文所探讨的重点,我们在此不作细致讨论,若大家感兴趣,可以私信至透镜公司研究微信公号后台,我们视情况再作进一步的具体案例分析。

The company's investment gains are not primarily from bank finance, securities or other derivatives investments, but largely from equity investments, and a significant portion of them are book fair value change gains that are not supported by actual cash flows -- and even more so, Huayi Brothers's return on these changes in fair value is a large amount of book increments resulting from adjustments in purely accounting accounting accounting, which is often referred to as \"profit from cash flow through accounting manipulation \"-- but this point is not the focus of this discussion.

  总之,从上述数据不难看出,王中军、王中磊这对王氏兄弟的资本运作水平似乎要远比其影视业务的运作水准高出不只一个量级:至少,相比投资收益而言,华谊兄弟在影视主业方向上取得的直接利润要逊色太多。

In short, it is not difficult to see from the above data, wang zhongjun, wang zhonglei this pair of wang brothers'capital operation level seems to be far more than its film and television business operation level of more than one order of magnitude: at least, compared to the investment income, huayi brothers in the main industry in the direction of direct profits are too much.

  如果透镜公司研究没有猜错的话,对资本运作“入木三分”,这或许正是今天王氏兄弟选择“清仓式”质押股票的重要幕后原因:公开资料显示,王氏兄弟手中持有的华谊兄弟股票质押率分别达到了%和%,而且双方还频繁的变更质押及补充质押。

If lens's research is not wrong, it may be the important reason behind the choice of \"clearance\" pledge by the wang brothers today: public information shows that the pledge rate of huayi's shares held by wang brothers is% and% respectively, and the two sides frequently change the pledge and supplement the pledge.

  实际上,股权投资并不是华谊兄弟投资生意版图的全部。公开资料显示,除了股权投资之外,王氏兄弟还特别喜欢直接“买买买”,历史上华谊兄弟曾多次大手笔、超高溢价收购冯小刚、张国立、李晨等艺人名下的公司或工作室――关于这些,公开市场上的报道就太多了,透镜公司研究不再一一枚举――不过,需要指出的是,华谊兄弟上述“买买买”购置的资产由于被直接纳入合并报表,其损益并不会出现在利润表的“投资收益”之列,因此如果仅从投资收益一项指标来判断华谊兄弟的整体投资版图,其结果其实仍是被显著低估的。

In fact, equity investment is not the whole business of Huayi Brothers. Public information shows that in addition to equity investments, wang's brothers also particularly like to buy directly, Huayi Brothers has made a number of big, ultra-high premium acquisitions of companies or studios under the names of artists such as Feng Xiaogang, Zhang Guoli, Li Chen and so on -- there are too many reports on the open market, and the lens research is no longer one -- but it should be noted that the above-mentioned \"buy-to-buy\" assets are not listed as \"investment returns\" in the profit statement because they are directly included in the consolidated statement, so if only one indicator of investment returns is used to judge the overall investment map of Huayi Brothers, the result is still significantly undervalued.

  透镜公司研究的上述分析结果表明,自2012年以来,华谊兄弟长期依赖投资业务驱动利润表的扩张,但从其最近两年的投资业务表现来看,华谊兄弟这种“投资换增长”的模式很可能已经迎来了拐点。

The above analysis by lens shows that since 2012, huayi has long relied on investment business to drive the expansion of profit statement, but in terms of its investment business performance in the last two years, the \"investment for growth\" model of huayi brothers is likely to have ushered in an inflection point.

  2018年,尽管华谊兄弟的账面投资收益仍然达到了亿元,但该项指标却已创下了近六年的新低,较2017年大幅缩水了%;2019年前三季度,华谊兄弟的投资收益更是直接转入亏损轨道,出现了最近10年以来的首次亏损,且亏损额高达亿元――也就是说,投资收益已经不仅不能再驱动华谊兄弟利润表的扩张,反而还成了扩大其整体亏损的加速器了。

In 2018, the index hit a nearly six-year low, a sharp decline of% from 2017, and in the first three quarters of 2019, Huayi Brothers lost its first loss in the last 10 years, and lost as much as 100 million yuan -- that is, it could no longer drive the expansion of Huayi's profit statement, but instead became an accelerator to expand its overall losses.

  透镜公司研究认为,这样的结果对于华谊兄弟来说并不意外,因为华谊兄弟的投资布局主要是围绕着其自身所处行业的上、下游及周边展开的,这样的扩张之所以在过去近十年能够取得不错的账面投资回报,主要是由于影视娱乐及互联网行业的资产泡沫此前一直处于较高水平;但最近两年,影视娱乐及互联网资产似乎由原来的“香饽饽”变成了“鬼见怕”――随着国内资本市场上影视娱乐及互联网资产泡沫的破灭,很多上市公司因此“商誉爆表”,最终引发严重的业绩惨剧,华谊兄弟便是其中的代表性公司之一。

This is not a surprise to huayi brothers, which has seen its investment in the past decade largely around the top, bottom and bottom of its industry, and around it. But in the last two years, huayi's investment in entertainment and internet seems to have turned into one of the company's best interests -- with the bursting of the domestic capital market's film, television, entertainment and internet asset bubble, many listed companies have been able to make a \"statement of goodwill,\" which led to a serious performance drama.

  前文已经提到过,华谊兄弟2018年的资产减值损失高达亿元,其中仅商誉减值损失一项就高达近10亿元,这是导致该公司当年归属股东净利润整体巨额亏损亿元的直接原因――而导致华谊兄弟2018年计提巨额商誉减值损失的原因,正是此前该公司超高溢价收购的冯小刚和张国立旗下公司未达盈利预期所致。

As mentioned earlier, huayi brothers lost as much as 100 million yuan in impairment of assets in 2018, of which nearly 1 billion yuan was lost in impairment of goodwill alone, which is the direct cause of the company's huge loss of 100 million yuan in net profit as a whole -- and the result of the huge loss of goodwill impairment in 2018.

  透镜公司研究认为,在资产泡沫破灭之后,投资业务已经很难再像泡沫破灭以前一样为华谊兄弟的利润表持续贡献大额利润,不仅如此,华谊兄弟资产负债表上由过去持续大额对外投资扩张而形成的巨额长期股权投资、其他权益工具投资以及商誉等资产反而还存在巨大的账面价值减值风险,这些减值风险将成为华谊兄弟未来最大的财务隐患。

After the bursting of the asset bubble, the investment business is no longer as likely as it was before to continue to contribute substantial profits to huayi's profit statement, not least because of the huge long-term equity investment, other equity instruments and goodwill on huayi's balance sheet, which are the biggest future financial risks for huayi brothers.

  上述判断已经在华谊兄弟2019年的三季报中得到了验证:该公司之所以在2019年前三季度出现亿元的巨额投资亏损,主要原因就是由于其在报告期内处置变卖其前几年通过分步交易高溢价买入的控股孙公司GDCTechnologyLimited股权所致――而且,这还只是目前已经实际处置的部分,对于那些目前仍然挂在华谊兄弟资产负债表账上、尚未实际处理的投资性资产(尤其是以公允价值计量的长期股权投资),其账面价值是否存在大额减值风险?这个问题的答案,或许只有等到华谊兄弟正式发布2019年年报之后才能揭晓。

This judgment has been validated in Huayi Brothers '2019 three-quarter report: the company ' s huge investment loss of $100 million in the first three quarters of 2019 was mainly due to its disposal during the reporting period and the sale of its long-term investment in GDCT Technology Limited, a holding Sun company that had been bought through a high step-by-step trading premium – and is it only part of the book risk that has been actually disposed of, and that there is significant impairment on those assets that are still on Huayi Brothers ' balance sheet that have not yet been actually invested (especially at fair value)? The answer to this question may only be revealed after Huayi Brothers has officially released its 2019 annual report.

  此外,透镜公司研究需要强调的是,很多的新经济、尤其是互联网巨头(比如BAT)的投资业务所创造的投资收益也在各自的利润表中占据举足轻重的位置,他们的增长逻辑同样也是靠“主业 投资”双轮驱动的,但我们认为,这种“双轮驱动”的前提是:标的公司必须要有非常强大的主营业务做为支撑,其主营业务必须能够稳定地贡献巨额利润,具有为投资业务持续输血的能力或潜力,否则,投资业务就很容易变成“空中楼阁”――但很显然,对于近85%的历史净利润来自于投资收益的华谊兄弟来说,它的主营业务盈利能力显然并不强,似乎很难支撑其投资业务的长期、持续、稳定运转。

In addition, lens research needs to emphasize that many new economies, especially the investments of internet giants such as bat, have also made a significant difference in their profit statements, and their growth logic is also based on the \"main business\" The premise of investing in a two-wheel-drive business is that the underlying company must have a very strong main business to support it, and its main business must be able to contribute substantial profits steadily and have the ability or potential to continue the blood transfusion for the investment business, otherwise, the investment business will easily become a castle in the air -- but it is clear that for Huayi Brothers, whose profit is nearly 85% of the historical net profit from the investment proceeds, its main business profitability is clearly not strong and it seems difficult to sustain the long-term, sustained and stable operation of its investment business.

  再来看看华谊兄弟的流动性状况,透镜公司研究注意到,在连续两年的巨额亏损过后,华谊兄弟的资产负债结构急剧恶化,其流动资产已经不难覆盖其流动负债,其资金链已经处于非常紧张的状态,未来的偿债压力山大。

Another look at huayi's liquidity situation, lens research notes, after two consecutive years of huge losses, huayi's balance sheet structure has deteriorated sharply, its current assets have not been difficult to cover its current liabilities, its capital chain has been in a very tight state, the future of debt service pressure.

  截至2019年9月30日,华谊兄弟账的流动资产总额只有亿元,但其同期的流动负债总额却达到了亿元――流动资产不能覆盖流动负债,流动比率跌破100%,这种情况在华谊兄弟的历史上还是首次出现;事实上,华谊兄弟历史上资金链一直非常稳健,在连续巨亏之前的2017年,华谊兄弟的流动比率为%,其当时的偿债能力并不存在问题;但到了巨亏开始的2018年底,其流动比例已经降至只有%,偿债压力从那时起便已经开始显现。

As of September 30,2019, the total current assets of Huayi Brothers account was only 100 million yuan, but its current liabilities reached 100 million yuan in the same period -- the current assets could not cover the current liabilities, and the current ratio fell below 100%, which is the first time in Huayi Brothers'history; in fact, Huayi Brothers'historical capital chain has been very robust, and Huayi Brothers'liquidity ratio was% in 2017 before the successive losses, and its solvency was not problematic at that time; but by the end of 2018, when the huge losses began, its liquidity ratio had fallen to only%, and the pressure had begun to appear since then.

  连续巨亏之后,到期债务压力却丝毫不减,此销彼涨之后,华谊兄弟账上的货币资金余额由2017年底的亿元锐减至2019年三季度末的亿元――然而,从最新的财务数据动态变化方向来看,仅靠账面资金显然远不足以解决华谊兄弟的债务压力问题。

After a series of huge losses, the pressure on maturing debt has not diminished, and after that rise, the balance of money on Huayi Brothers'accounts has plummeted from $100 million at the end of 2017 to $100 million at the end of the third quarter of 2019-- but, in terms of the direction of the latest financial data, it is clear that book money alone is not enough to solve Huayi Brothers's debt pressure problem.

  资产负债表显示,华谊兄弟在2019年前三季度顺利渡过了该公司史上最大规模的到期债务集中兑付洪峰:其一年内到期的非流动负债余额从2019年初的亿元下降至9月底的亿元――这意味着华谊兄弟在短短九个月内至少集中清偿了超过24亿元的巨额到期债务,这些债务主要是到期的长期借款和应付债券。

According to the balance sheet, Huayi Brothers successfully crossed the largest concentration of maturing debt in its history in the first three quarters of 2019: its balance of non-current liabilities due in one year fell from $100 million at the beginning of 2019 to $100 million at the end of September - meaning Huayi Brothers concentrated on paying at least $2.4 billion in huge maturing debt in just nine months, mainly long-term borrowing and bonds due.

  尽管从结果来看是有惊无险,但其间过程却似乎仍然让人捏了一把汗:华谊兄弟平安度过2019年这波债务洪峰靠的不是自身的主营业务经营及资产处置和变现能力――就在该公司顺利集中兑付24亿元巨额到期债务的同时,其资产负债表另一端的短期借款余额也从年初的亿元骤增至三季度末的亿元,同时其应付债券余额也增加了亿元,其长期借款余额则基本保持不变――即:华谊兄弟新增的有息负债规模,与其同期内偿付的有息负债规模大致相当。

Although the result is a surprise, the process still seems to have made a dent: huayi's balance of short-term loans at one end of its balance sheet rose from $100 million at the beginning of the year to $100 million at the end of the third quarter, while its long-term debt balance remained largely unchanged -- i.e., huayi's new interest-bearing liabilities were on a similar scale in the same period.

  通过上面的数据分析不难看出,在主营业务和投资业务双双巨额亏损的情况下,为了应对各种到期债务压力,账上货币资金锐减、囊中羞涩的华谊兄弟正在通过大规模地“借新还旧”来滚动到期债务――但如此滚动偿债,显然不是最终的解决之道。

From the above data analysis, it is easy to see that in the case of huge losses in both the main business and investment business, in response to various kinds of debt pressure to maturity, the money on the account of the sharp decline, cash-strapped Huayi Brothers through a large-scale \"borrow to repay the old\" to roll the debt due -- but such a rolling repayment is clearly not the final solution.

  透镜公司研究预计,中长期来看,如果华谊兄弟的主营业务不发生远超预期的大逆转,该公司未来大概率会走向海航故路――即:开启战略收缩模式,大规模地处置资产变现,“缩表瘦身”,以清偿到期债务。

In the medium to long term, lens expects that if huayi's main business doesn't reverse far more than expected, the company's future high probability will go to hna's old road -- that is, to open a strategic contraction mode, to dispose of assets on a large scale, and to \"shrink\" to pay off maturing debts.

  透镜公司研究认为,最有可能会被华谊兄弟优先处置的资产,便是其长期的投资活动过程中所积累的投资性资产,包括长期股权投资和其他权益工具投资,理由如下:

According to Lens, the assets most likely to be prioritized by Huayi Brothers are investment assets accumulated in the course of their long-term investment activities, including long-term equity investments and other equity instruments, for the following reasons:

  其一,相比影视业务,这些投资性资产并非华谊兄弟核心主营业务,砍掉也在情理之中――目前海航系为了解决债务问题,也在大规模处置变卖非核心资产;

First, compared to the film and television business, these investment assets are not Huayi Brothers core main business, it is also reasonable to chop off - the current HNA to solve the debt problem, but also in the large-scale disposal of non-core assets;

  其二,这些投资性资产之前对于华谊兄弟来说是能够创造账面利润的“肥肉”,但现在反而成了制造亏损或亏损风险的“赘肉”,留之已无益――投资性资产在华谊兄弟的资产负债表中已处于“爆表”状态:截至2019年9月30日,华谊兄弟账上的长期股权投资余额高达亿元,其他权益投资工具余额也达到了亿元,两项相加余额高达亿元,占到了华谊兄弟同期总资产的%,占其净资产的比重更是高达%。

Second, these investment assets were previously \"fat\" for Huayi Brothers to generate book profits, but now they are \"fat\" to create the risk of loss or loss, leaving them unprofitable -- investment assets in Huayi Brothers'balance sheet: as of September 30,2019, Huayi Brothers had a long-term equity balance of up to $100 million and other equity instruments of up to $100 million, or a combined balance of up to $100 million, or a percentage of Huayi Brothers's total assets in the same period.


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